We investigate the notion of a signature in Polyadic Inductive Logic and study the probability functions satisfying the Principle of Signature Exchangeability. In the binary case, we prove a representation theorem for such functions and show that they satisfy a binary version of the Principle of Instantial Relevance. We discuss polyadic versions of the Principle of Instantial Relevance and Johnson's Sufficientness Postulate.
Introduction
This paper is set in Pure Inductive Logic (PIL), see for example [10] , which the reader is referred to for background and an extensive bibliography. In this subject, we are concerned with assigning subjective probabilities to sentences of a language according to rational considerations, traditionally based on the notions of symmetry, relevance and irrelevance.
The principle of Constant Exchangeability (Ex) or in Carnap's terms, the Axiom of Symmetry [1, 3] , is a widely accepted and commonly assumed rational requirement in Pure Inductive Logic. Informally, this is the statement that in the absence of further knowledge, different individuals of our universe should be treated equally. In the usual framework of Inductive Logic it means that the probability assigned to a sentence is independent of the particular constants instantiating it. In addition, in the thoroughly studied unary context, this principle exists in an equivalent formulation -as invariance under signatures of state descriptions. This unary characterisation of the principle has led to some of the most significant results in Unary Inductive Logic thus far. These include, for example, a complete characterisation of functions satisfying Ex, and the Principle of Instantial Relevance (see page 5) following as a logical consequence of Constant Exchangeability.
In contrast, such results have so far not translated satisfactorily into the polyadic. Having extended the concept of atoms to polyadic languages (see [10, 12] ), in this account we generalise the notion of a signature to polyadic Inductive Logic and investigate the theory this yields for higher arity languages. We begin by giving a brief account of the unary portion we shall be concerned with for the purpose of this paper, then suggest new methods and formulations for these concepts for general polyadic languages. Specifically, we present a polyadic definition of a signature and a principle of invariance under this notion, an independence principle characterising the basic functions satisfying this new signature-based principle, and polyadic versions of the Principle of Instantial Relevance and Johnson's Sufficientness Postulate. We present this initially for languages with at most binary relation symbols and then, in the second part of the paper, we focus on the general case.
The context of this paper is as follows. We work with a first order language L containing finitely many relation symbols R 1 , . . . , R q of arities r 1 , . . . , r q respectively and countably many constant symbols a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , . . ., using the usual logical connectives and quantifiers. SL denotes the set of all sentences of the language L and QF SL the set of all quantifier free sentences of the language. b 1 , . . . , b n or sometimes also b 1 , . . . , b n are used to denote some distinct constants from amongst the a 1 , a 2 , . . ., and S n stands for the set of permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We say that a language is unary if it contains only unary predicate symbols; it is r-ary if all its relation symbols are at most r-ary and at least one is r-ary. If r = 2, we say binary rather than 2-ary. In addition, since we are interested in formulae only up to logical equivalence, we will often use '=' in place of '≡'.
Definition. A function w : SL → [0, 1] is a probability function if for all θ, φ and ∃x ψ(x) ∈ SL (P1) If θ is logically valid then w(θ) = 1. (P2) If θ and φ are mutually exclusive then w(θ ∨ φ) = w(θ) + w(φ). (P3) w(∃x ψ(x)) = lim n→∞ w(ψ(a 1 ) ∨ ψ(a 2 ) ∨ . . . ∨ ψ(a n )).
Probability functions have a number of desirable properties, see for example [10] ; note in particular that logically equivalent sentences always get the same probability.
The conditional probability of θ given φ, for φ such that w(φ) = 0, is defined as follows:
We adopt the convention that expressions like w(θ | φ) = a stand for w(θ ∧ φ) = a w(φ) even if w(φ) = 0.
Any w satisfying just (P1) and (P2) on the quantifier free sentences of L has a unique extension to a probability function on SL, see [6] , so in many situations it suffices to think of probability functions as defined on quantifier free sentences only, and satisfying (P1) and (P2).
As explained in [10, Chapter 7] , this can be further reduced to a special class of such sentences called state descriptions, that is, to sentences Θ(b 1 , . . . , b m ) of the form q i=1 j 1 ...,jr i ∈{1,...,m} r i
where ±R i (b j 1 . . . , b jr i ) denotes one of R i (b j 1 . . . , b jr i ), ¬R i (b j 1 . . . , b jr i ). Furthermore, any w defined on state descriptions Θ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m ), m ∈ N to satisfy (i) w(Θ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m )) ≥ 0, (ii) w( ) = 1, (iii) w(Θ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m )) = Φ(a 1 ,a 2 ,...,a m+1 )|=Θ(a 1 ,a 2 ,...,am)
w(Φ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m+1 )) extends uniquely to a probability function on QF SL and hence on SL.
If Θ(b 1 , . . . , b m ) is a state description then Θ(x 1 , . . . , x m ) is called a state formula. We use the capital Greek letters Θ, Φ, Ψ for state descriptions and state formulae. That is, the conjunction of the literals from (1) with {j 1 , . . . , j r i } ⊆ {k 1 , . . . , k g }.
When the language is r-ary, the state formulae for r variables are called (polyadic) atoms, see [12] or [10] . In the case of a unary language, the atoms are the conjunctions q i=1 ±R i (x) and they are usually denoted α 1 (x), . . . , α 2 q (x). The idea of atoms has played an essential role in the study of Unary Inductive Logic since its conception by Johnson and Carnap, even if their formal expression of it differed [7, 2] . In particular, unary atoms have been used to formulate and investigate basic principles of the subject. This is possible, since unary state descriptions are the conjunctions of (instantiated) atoms,
(where h j ∈ {1, . . . , 2 q }), and thus unary atoms form the basic building blocks of all sentences of a unary language.
Some Basic Principles of Unary Inductive Logic
The Principle of Constant Exchangeability is usually stated for a general (not necessarily unary) language as follows:
Constant Exchangeability, Ex Let θ(a 1 , . . . , a m ) ∈ SL and let b 1 , . . . , b m be any other choice of distinct constant symbols from amongst the a 1 , a 2 , . . ..
It can be equivalently expressed as requiring (3) to hold only for state descriptions Θ instead of general θ ∈ SL, see [10, Chapter 8] . This leads to a simpler formulation of Ex for unary languages (as mentioned above), based on the notion of a signature. The signature of a state description Θ as in (2) is defined to be the vector m 1 , . . . , m 2 q where m i is the number of times that α i appears amongst the α h j . Ex in the unary case thus amounts to Constant Exchangeability, unary version The probability of a state description depends only on its signature.
We now mention a collection of important principles from Unary Inductive Logic that are stated in terms of (unary) atoms.
Atom Exchangeability, Ax Let Θ(b 1 , . . . , b m ) = m j=1 α h j (b j ) be a state description and σ ∈ S 2 q . Then
This principle can be equivalently expressed as requiring that state descriptions
must have the same probability.
Principle of Instantial Relevance, PIR
This principle was suggested by Carnap [2, Chapter 13] and expresses the idea that having witnessed an event in the past should enhance (or at least should not decrease) our belief that we might see it again in future.
Johnson's Sufficientness Postulate, JSP w α i (a m+1 ) | m j=1 α h j (a j ) depends only on m and on m i , where m i is the number of times that α i appears amongst the α h j .
First appearing in [7] , JSP states that our belief in seeing an individual with a certain combination of properties should depend only on how many individuals we have seen, and how many of them have satisfied exactly the same combination of properties.
Principle of Induction, PI Assume that m i ≤ m s , where m i , m s are the numbers of times that α i , α s respectively appear amongst the α h j . Then
This principle [10, Chapter 21] says that if we have already seen at least as many individuals with a certain combination of properties as with another combination, we should think the next individual at least as likely to have the first combination of properties as the second.
Finally, we mention the (not necessarily unary) Constant Irrelevance or Independence Principle. It is not stated in terms of atoms, but it plays a role in what follows.
Constant Independence Principle, IP Let θ, φ ∈ QF SL have no constant symbols in common. Then
In the unary context [10, Chapter 8] , the only probability functions satisfying IP together with Ex are the w x functions, where x = x 1 , . . . , x 2 q is from
and w x is determined by
where m i is again the number of times that α i appears amongst the α h j . Thus w x is the (unique) function that assigns the probability x i to all α i (a j ) regardless of j, and treats instantiations of atoms (both the same or different) by distinct constants as stochastically independent. These functions are remarkably useful because they are simple and since all unary probability functions satisfying Ex can be generated from them as continuous convex combinations (integrals). The precise statement of this claim [5] is de Finetti's Representation Theorem. Let L be a unary language with q predicate symbols and let w be a probability function on SL satisfying Ex. Then there is a normalised, σ-additive measure µ on the Borel subsets of D 2 q such that
for any state description Θ of L, and conversely, given such a µ, w as above extends uniquely to a probability function on SL satisfying Ex.
Early results of Unary Inductive Logic show that any probability function satisfying Ex also satisfies PIR (as already mentioned, [6] ), and that -provided the language has at least two predicate symbols -any probability function satisfying Ex and JSP must be one of rather special functions called the Carnap Continuum functions ( [7] , and others). A later result due to Paris and Waterhouse [9] shows that any probability function satisfying Ex and Ax must also satisfy PI.
These are pleasing results in Pure Inductive Logic, since we know that if we make these rational requirements, we also gain their consequences -a PIL version of 'buy one (or two), get one free'. So, for example, if we are happy to accept Ex and Ax we also gain PI.
An Atom-based Approach for Binary Languages
We shall now consider how atoms can aid us to understand the properties of probability functions in the case when r is 2. That is, when L contains some binary relation symbols and possibly some unary predicate symbols, but no symbols of higher arity. We shall denote the unary predicate symbols by P 1 , . . . , P q 1 and the binary symbols by Q 1 , . . . , Q q 2 (rather than by R i as we do for a general language), with q 1 + q 2 = q.
In this language, the state formulae for one variable have the form
and we will write
for them (in some fixed order). We also refer to these formulae as 1-atoms.
The atoms of the language 3 , that is, the state formulae for two variables, have the form
±Q i (y, x) . 3 We sometimes say binary atoms for emphasis or, in some contexts later on, also 2-atoms. Note that 2-atoms will mean the same thing as atoms just when the language is binary.
There are N = 2 2q 2 2q 2 atoms, and we shall denote them
In order to help visualise the binary case, we introduce the notation δ s (x, y) for the conjunctions
, where s = 1, . . . , 2 q 2 . Any atom γ h (x, y) can then be written as
for some 1 ≤ k, c ≤ 2
We shall represent such an atom by the matrix k e d c .
We refer to β k (x) ∧ β c (y) as the unary trace of the atom (4).
Example. When L has just one, binary, relation symbol Q (that is, when q 1 = 0, q 2 = 1) then β 1 (x) and β 2 (x) are Q(x, x) and ¬Q(x, x) respectively, and δ 1 (x, y) and δ 2 (x, y) are Q(x, y) and ¬Q(x, y) respectively. One possible atom of this language is
and it is represented by the matrix
Using atoms, a state description of L can be written as
and it can be represented by an m × m matrix 
for some
This means that depending on whether i < t or t < i, γ h i,t is
for that e for which Θ(
Clearly, there is much over-specification in the expression (5); for example, we must have γ h t,i (x, y) = γ h i,t (y, x). A more efficient way of writing a state description (for at least two individuals) in terms of atoms is to restrict i, t in (5) to i < t,
This contains all the information about Θ and it still over-specifies all that concerns single individuals. In this paper we will find it convenient to make this part of the state description visible, so we shall write it as
This works even when m = 1. We adopt a convention that if needed we still write γ h t,i (x, y) for γ h i,t (y, x).
Definition. For Θ as in (7), we define 1≤i≤m
to be the unary trace of Θ. Any conjunction of this form is called a unary trace for b 1 , . . . , b m .
We remark that when using atoms, some over-specification is unavoidable. It is possible to develop an approach to Polyadic Inductive Logic using just elements 4 rather than atoms (where elements in the binary case are the β k and δ s , and analogously for higher arity languages), and thus to avoid overspecification. However, such a 'disjointed' approach fails to capture much of the structure of the sentences we wish to work with. For example, in the disjointed approach, the ordered pairs obtained from each other by changing the order of the two individuals are treated separately, and although there are some advantages to doing this, some crucial connections are lost.
Using the alternative formulation of the unary Atom Exchangeability principle from page 5, and (5), it is straightforward to see how to formulate a binary counterpart of the Atom Exchangeability principle. The same approach works also for higher arity languages. This was investigated in [12] and it appears also in [10] , so we will not pursue it in the present paper any further.
For the other principles we will need also the concept of a partial state description. These are sentences which, like state descriptions, specify all that can be said about all single individuals from amongst the b 1 , . . . , b m , and all that can be said about some pairs of them:
where C is some set of 2-element subsets of {b 1 , . . . , b m }.
We use capital Greek letters also for partial state descriptions.
Example. Using the representation described above for L containing just one binary relation symbol Q, the matrix
represents the (full) state description
represents the partial state description
The matrix
represents no partial state description since it gives some -but not allinformation about the pair
We remark that if C in (9) contains no 2-element subsets, that is C = ∅, then (9) is still a partial state description. In particular, a unary trace for b 1 , . . . , b m is a partial state description for b 1 , . . . , b m . Secondly, we mention that partial state formulae are defined analogously to partial state descriptions, with b 1 , . . . , b m replaced by (distinct) variables x 1 , . . . , x m .
Binary Signatures
In Unary Inductive Logic, it is almost always the case that Ex is assumed.
If we wish to continue assuming Ex and to base our theory on polyadic atoms, we need to be able to work with the atoms in a way which reflects that atoms obtained from each other by permuting the variables are in some sense equivalent and represent the same thing.
In the binary case, atoms have two variables and there is only one non-trivial permutation of {x, y}. If γ(x, y) is the atom represented by
then permuting x and y yields the atom represented by c d e k .
If k = c and e = d then these are the same atom.
Hence, when wishing to disregard the order, the behaviour of pairs of individuals should be classified by the atom they satisfy, only up to the equivalence defined on atoms by
This means that rather than N different ways a pair can behave, there are p < N of them, where p is the number 5 of ∼-equivalence classes.
It will be convenient to introduce notation for these equivalence classes; we shall denote them by Γ 1 , . . . , Γ p . From above, it follows that each class is
for some k, c, e, d, and it has either two elements, or just one (when k = c and e = d). For fixed k and c, A(k, c) will denote the set of all j such that Γ j consists of the atoms (10) for some e, d.
Within the equivalence class (10), the unary trace of an atom determines the atom, except when k = c and e = d. We shall associate a number with each class Γ j accordingly: 1 if the unary traces do determine its atoms and 2 otherwise. We denote this number s j .
Definition. For a state description
we define the signature of Θ to be the vector n 1 , . . . , n p , where n j is the number of i, t such that 1 ≤ i < t ≤ m and γ h i,t ∈ Γ j . If Θ is represented by (6) and Γ j is (10), then n j is the number of times one of the atoms from (10) appears as a submatrix of (6).
We shall define also the extended signature of Θ to be
where m k is the number of times that k appears amongst the k i , i = 1, . . . , m.
We remark that the extended signature is derivable from the signature, but it will be convenient for us to record the m part explicitly.
Note that if m n is the extended signature of some state description
and
Conversely, thinking about state descriptions in terms of matrices as in (6), we can see that any m n = m 1 , . . . , m 2 q ; n 1 , . . . , n p such that (12) and (13) hold, is an extended signature of some Θ(b 1 , . . . , b m ) for m defined by (11), so we refer to such vectors as extended signatures on m.
If the binary case behaved like the unary, Ex would be equivalent to the requirement that the probability of a state description depends only on its signature. However, as we shall see below, this is not the case and so we are led to define the Signature Exchangeability Principle (binary), BEx Let L be a binary language and let w be a probability function on SL. Then the probability of a state description depends only on its signature.
BEx clearly still implies Ex but the converse implication does not hold: BEx is strictly stronger than Ex. Rather than providing a general proof, we will illustrate why this is so on the case of the language L containing just one binary relation symbol Q. , 0, 0, . . . , see [10, Chapter 29] , is one such function.
The probability functions satisfying BEx share a number of properties with those satisfying Ex in the unary case. In particular, there is a large class of relatively simply defined probability functions similar to the unary w x (as described on Page 6) which satisfy BEx. These functions are characterised by an independence principle similar to the Constant Independence Principle (IP). In addition, there is a de Finetti-style representation theorem telling us that any probability function satisfying BEx can be expressed as a convex combination of these special functions (as an integral). This, in turn, yields a proof of a binary generalisation of the Principle of Instantial Relevance, and a characterisation of a binary Carnap Continuum as the unique functions satisfying a binary generalisation of Johnson's Sufficientness Postulate. We begin with independence.
Binary Independence
The Constant Independence Principle IP (for any language), see page 6, requires that any two quantifier free sentences which have no constants in common are stochastically independent. In other words, probability functions satisfying this principle have the property that evidence concerning certain individuals has no impact on probabilities assigned to sentences involving different individuals.
In sentences involving only unary predicate symbols, occurrences of predicates are instantiated by single constants; no predicate can bring two constants together in the way binary relations do. Hence, when the language is unary, the notion of independence used in IP is the strongest one, based on requiring that individuals do not interfere with others. In the binary case, however, beyond simply requiring that individuals do not interfere, we may require the same of pairs of individuals in the following sense.
Definition. For a sentence ψ of a binary language L we define C 2 ψ to be the set of (unordered) pairs of constants {a i , a j }, i = j, such that a i and a j are brought together instantiating a relation in ψ.
That is, for some binary relation symbol Q of L -either ±Q(a i , a j ) or ±Q(a j , a i ) appears in ψ. We say that sentences φ, ψ such that C 2 φ and C 2 ψ are disjoint instantiate no pairs in common. Such sentences cannot reasonably be required to be independent outright because of information each may contain concerning single individuals, but they can be independent conditionally.
Strong Independence Principle (binary), BIP Let L be a binary language and assume that φ, ψ ∈ QF SL instantiate no pairs in common. Let b 1 , . . . , b s be the constants that φ and ψ have in common (if any) and let ∆(b 1 , . . . , b s ) be a unary trace for these constants. Then
If s = 0 (the sentences have no constants in common) then ∆ = (tautology), so BIP implies IP.
We shall now define the binary versions w Y of the unary w x mentioned on page 6. Let D L be the set of all
such that x k , y j ≥ 0 and 2 q k=1 x k = 1, and such that for any 1
(A(k, c) was defined on page 12). We intend to define w Y so that these functions satisfy Ex, BIP,
and Γ j its equivalence class -that is, Γ j is (10) -then
To this end, it is convenient to write j(h) for j such that γ h ∈ Γ j . To make the notation more manageable, we also write z h for y j(h) . Hence the y j are associated with the equivalence classes Γ j of atoms, and the z h assign these same values to the individual atoms in these classes. In terms of the z h , (15) says that the sum over z h for those γ h with a given unary trace is 1.
For a state description
Note that if σ ∈ S m and
the multiset {k σ −1 (i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} equals the multiset {k i : 1 ≤ i ≤ m}, and the multisets {h σ −1 (i),σ −1 (t) : 1 ≤ i < t ≤ m}, {h i,t : 1 ≤ i < t ≤ m} can only differ in that the former contains h i ,t in place of h t ,i when
Theorem 1. Let L be a binary language. The functions w Y defined above determine probability functions on SL that satisfy BEx and BIP (and hence also Ex and IP).
Furthermore, any probability function satisfying Ex and BIP is equal to w Y for some Y .
Proof. w = w Y clearly satisfies properties (i), (ii) from page 3. To show that it satisfies (iii), let Θ(a 1 , . . . , a m ) be as above. The Θ + (a 1 , . . . , a m , a m+1 ) which extend Θ(a 1 , . . . , a m ) have the form
6 Recall the convention from page 9 needed below when σ
where c is any of 1, . . . , 2 q and the unary trace of
The value of w Y (Θ + ) for Θ + as in (17) is
For a given c and for each i = 1, . . . , m, the sum of the eligible z h i,m+1 is 1, since we are summing over all the z h i,m+1 such that γ h i,m+1 has trace
So summing the w Y (Θ + ) successively over these h i,m+1 and then over c yields w Y (Θ). Hence (iii) holds, too. It follows that w Y extends to a probability function on SL which moreover, by the remark preceding the theorem, satisfies Ex.
A similar argument now shows that (16) To show BIP, we note that continuing with the same reasoning, we can show also that for a partial state description
we have
Assume that Φ and Ψ are some partial state descriptions which instantiate no pairs in common. Let b 1 , . . . , b s be the constants that Φ and Ψ have in common and let ∆ be a unary trace for these constants. If ∆ is not consistent with Φ or Ψ, then we clearly have
because both sides are 0. So suppose Φ is as in (18), s ≤ m,
where D is some set of 2-element subsets of
We can now use the above observation regarding values of w Y for partial state descriptions to prove that (19) holds in this case, too, since both sides are
Hence BIP holds when φ, ψ are partial state descriptions.
To prove that (14) 
as required.
For the final part of the theorem, assume that w satisfies Ex and BIP. We define
where β k (x) ∧ β c (y) is the unary trace of γ h (x, y). Note that by Ex, this definition is correct in that it does not matter which a i , a t we take, and when j = j(h) = j(g) (that is, when γ h ∼ γ g ), then z h = z g , and y j is given the same value. Using BIP, we can check that with Y defined in this way, w Y equals w for state descriptions, and hence w = w Y for all sentences.
Representation Theorem
We showed in Theorem 1 that the probability functions w Y satisfy BEx. We now prove that the functions satisfying BEx are exactly the convex combinations of the w Y functions in the following sense.
Theorem 2. Let w be a probability function for a binary language L satisfying BEx. Then there exists a (normalised, σ-additive) measure µ on the Borel subsets of D L such that for any θ ∈ SL,
Conversely, for a given measure µ on the Borel subsets of D L , the function defined by (21) is a probability function on SL satisfying BEx.
Proof. Let w be a probability function for L satisfying BEx. It suffices to prove (21) for state descriptions, the rest follows, for instance, as in Corollary 9. 
and it proceeds via grouping state descriptions for u individuals according to their extended signature and counting their numbers.
Let t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ N, t 1 + t 2 + · · · + t n = t. We define
Let u ∈ N + and let u t = u 1 , . . . , u 2 q ; t 1 , . . . , t p be an extended signature on u. First, we wish to count the number of all state descriptions with this extended signature. Thinking about state descriptions in terms of u × u matrices as in (6) , this involves placing, on the diagonal, the number 1 u 1 times, the number 2 u 2 times and so on. We are thus creating u k u c many spaces (when k = c) or
many spaces in which to place atoms from the classes Γ j , j ∈ A(k, c) (k = c) or j ∈ A(k, k) respectively. Once a place for an atom from a given Γ j is chosen, no freedom remains over which atom from this class it is when k = c or when k = c and e = d (that is, when s j = 1). When k = c and e = d (i.e., when s j = 2), either one of the two atoms from this class can be chosen to fill the place.
It follows that the number of state descriptions with extended signature u t, denoted by N (∅, u t), is
Now let m n be an extended signature, m < u and let Θ(b 1 , . . . , b m ) be a state description with this signature. Arguing similarly to above, we find that the number of state descriptions with signature u t extending Θ(
We make the convention that our multinomial expression is 0 if any of the terms are negative. Note that the number calculated in (24) depends only on the signature m n and not on the particular choice of Θ(b 1 , . . . , b m ).
We shall write w( m n) for w (Θ(b 1 , . . . , b m )); by BEx this is unambiguous. Let Sign(u) denote the set containing all extended signatures u t on u. From (22)
N ( m n, u t) w( u t), and hence
We shall show that
is of the order O √ u −1 (independently of u 1 , . . . , u 2 q , t 1 , . . . , t p ). We make a convention that if some u k = 0 or some t j = 0 then terms involving these are missing from the product above.
First, let m k ≤ u k and n j ≤ t j for every j, k, so that none of the terms in (24) are negative. The term
in (26) can be written as
Let P stand for the product of (28), (29) and (30).
We observe that P is bounded by a constant independent of u, the u k and the t j . For example, Furthermore, we need only consider those k where m k > 0 in the limit of (26) since otherwise n j = 0 for j ∈ A(k, c) and factors involving corresponding u k , t j cancel out from N ( m n, u t) N (∅, u t)
, and they are all 1 in the product which is being subtracted.
We shall prove the claim about (26) by cases. Consider first the case that for some k with m k > 0 we have
each of the other products in (27) is at most 1, so (26) = | (27)
. A similar argument works if u k > √ u for every k with m k > 0 but for some j we have n j > 0 and t j ≤ √ u.
The second case is when for every k such that m k > 0, u k > √ u and for every j with n j > 0, t j > √ u. In this case, P is close to 1. To see this, note that (28) can be written as a product of m fractions of the form 1−αu k −1 1−βu −1 , α, β ∈ {1, . . . , m} and that the distance of each fraction from 1 is
Hence (28) Now suppose u k < m k for some k (the case when u k > m k for every k but some j is such that t j < n j is similar). Note that then
= 0. In addition, m k > 0 and u k < √ u, so arguing as above (27) would be of order O( √ u −1 ) and consequently so would (26), which exhausts all cases.
Define Y u t by
In what follows, we will write w u t for w Y u t . Note that w u t ( m n) is equal to (27).
We shall now employ methods from Nonstandard Analysis, particularly Loeb Measure Theory [8, 4] to complete the proof. An alternative classical proof may be found in [11] .
Let U * be a nonstandard ω 1 -saturated elementary extension of a sufficiently large portion U of the set theoretic universe containing w. As usual, c * denotes the image in U * of c ∈ U where these differ. Working now in U * , let u ∈ N * be nonstandard. Then (from (25)) we still have
Loeb Measure Theory enables us to conclude from (32) that for some σ-additive measure µ on Sign * (u) we have (for all standard extended signatures m n)
Since, in U , (26) is O √ u −1 , this gives
Moreover,
where the x k , y j are as defined in (31), means (34) becomes (using, for example, Proposition 1, Chapter 15 of [13] )
In the opposite direction, a function on SL defined by (21) clearly satisfies P1 and P2, and by the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem it also satisfies P3. So it is a probability function. This function satisfies BEx because all the w Y do.
We shall now use the above representation theorem to show that the w Y functions, which by Theorem 1 are the only probability functions satisfying BIP and Ex, can be characterised alternatively as the only probability functions satisfying IP and BEx. The fact that the w Y satisfy BEx and IP follows from Theorem 1 and the other part follows from the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let w be a probability function on SL satisfying BEx and IP. Then w is equal to
Proof. 7 Let µ be the σ-additive normalised measure guaranteed to exist by 
It follows that there exists a subset A of D L with µ measure 1 such that w Y (θ) as a function of Y is constant on A for every θ ∈ QF SL, see e.g. [11] for details. Therefore, for any Y ∈ A we must have that w and w Y are equal for quantifier free sentences and hence for all sentences, as required.
Binary Instantial Relevance
In this section we consider how the idea of instantial relevance might be captured in our atom-based binary context. Assuming that the available evidence is in the form of a partial state description, the evidence may be extended to another partial state description either by adding unary information about a new individual, or by adding a binary atom instantiated by a pair of individuals each of which may or may not be new. In each of these cases, if we have already learnt (and added to the evidence) the same information about another individual or pair of individuals, it should enhance our probability that this information will be learnt about the given individual or pair of individuals too.
Adding unary information about a single constant does not involve any intricacies, and instantial relevance amounts to requiring that for a partial state description ∆(a 1 , . . . , a m ) and any β k ,
Adding an atom instantiated by some constants b 1 , b 2 is more complicated, since such sentences are already determined to some degree by ∆ when one or both of b 1 , b 2 are amongst the a 1 , . . . , a m . More precisely, assume that
is consistent and that β k (x) ∧ β c (y) is the unary trace of γ h (x, y). Then ∆(a 1 , . . . , a m ) may already imply γ h (b 1 , b 2 ), or imply only
, or none of these. According to which of these holds, we define the Extra in γ h (b 1 , b 2 ) over ∆(a 1 , . . . , a m ) to be, in order,
respectively. Clearly, conditional probabilities of instantiated atoms given partial state descriptions should only be compared if the Extra in them over the evidence is the same. Let ∆(a 1 , . . . , a m ) be a partial state description. Then (35) holds for any β k . Furthermore, if γ h is an atom and
Binary Principle of Instantial Relevance
Theorem 4. Let w be a probability function on SL satisfying BEx. Then w satisfies the Binary Principle of Instantial Relevance.
Proof. First, note that every w Y satisfies (35) and (36) with equality by the definition of these functions. This is the case since
k , and, for example, when the above Extra is {{1, 2}, {2}} and the unary trace of γ h (x, y) is β k (x) ∧ β c (y), then
By Theorem 2, since w satisfies BEx, w is an integral of the w Y . Let µ be the corresponding measure. Then (35) and any instance of (36) become
for some function f (in the above cases, f ( Y ) is x k or y h x c respectively), and this integral inequality holds for any f , as required.
We remark that the same method yields the following related result:
Theorem 5. Let w be a probability function on SL satisfying BEx. Let ∆(a 1 , . . . , a m ) be a partial state description. If γ h is an atom and
Binary Sufficientness Postulate
Finally, we turn our attention to disregarding irrelevant information. A classical principle in the unary case is Johnson's Sufficientness Postulate (see Page 5) . This principle says that the conditional probability of a new constant satisfying an atom, given a state description, should not depend on what the other atoms in the state description do, only on how many constants the state description is about and how many of them satisfy this very same atom.
An earlier attempt at generalising Johnson's Sufficientness Postulate to the binary context was made in [14] , but it proved very restrictive in the sense that only two probability functions satisfied it. This earlier approach was not based on atoms, but rather focused on the conditional probability of a full state description for a 1 , . . . , a m+1 given a full state description for a 1 , . . . , a m . Such an approach corresponds to assuming that an agent learns about the world through successively encountering new individuals and learning everything about each of them -including all their connections to all individuals encountered previously -in one go.
However, suppose instead that the agent only learns all about (one or) two individuals at a time and learns nothing about their connections to other individuals. That is, the agent is always focusing on (at most) two individuals at any one time. The fact that the language is binary makes this a plausible assumption. Then it is clear that the evidence should be a partial state description, and that we need to consider the conditional probability of an instantiated atom -some γ h (a u , a v ), or a 1-atom -some β k (a u ).
Furthermore, for a partial state description
the probability of an extension of it by some β k (a m+1 ) (how a new individual behaves in isolation), should arguably depend only on the β k i (how other individuals behave in isolation), rather than on the γ h i,t . An extension of ∆ by some γ h (a u , a v ) for 1 ≤ u < v ≤ m, {a u , a v } / ∈ C (how a u and a v relate to each other given how each of them behaves in isolation), should depend only on those γ h i,t where a i and a t behave in isolation just as a u and a v do. Accordingly, we broaden the notion of the extended signature of a state description to partial state descriptions. We define the extended signature of ∆ as above, to be the vector m 1 , . . . , m 2 q ; n 1 , . . . , n p , where m k is the number of times that k appears amongst the k i and n j is the number of i, t such that {a i , a t } ∈ C and γ h i,t ∈ Γ j .
Recall that j(h) denotes the j for which γ h ∈ Γ j and A(k, c) denotes the set of all j = j(h) such that the unary trace of γ h (x, y) is β k (x) ∧ β c (y). The extended signature of ∆ still satisfies
but the sums of n j for j ∈ A(k, c) or A(k, k) no longer need to be as in (12), (13) and we define
Note that n k,c = n c,k .
Taking our argument further along the lines of the Unary Johnson's Sufficientness Postulate, we are led to the requirement that
• the conditional probability of β k (a m+1 ) given ∆ should depend only on m k and m, and noting that for j ∈ A(k u , k v ) there are s j (that is, 1 or 2) atoms γ h in Γ j such that γ h (a u , a v ) is consistent with ∆ (because the unary trace is fixed), we further require that
and h ∈ Γ j , the conditional probability of γ h (a u , a v ) given ∆ should depend only on n j , s j and n ku,kv .
The (atom-based) Binary Sufficientness Postulate consists of the two requirements above. It is shown in [15] that the unique regular 8 probability functions w satisfying Ex and this principle, are those for which the above conditional probabilities satisfy
n ku,kv + λ for some 0 < µ, λ ≤ ∞.
An Atom-based Approach for Polyadic Languages
For the rest of this paper, we assume again that L is a language with relation symbols R 1 , . . . , R q of arities r 1 , . . . , r q . Moreover, we assume that it is r-ary for some r > 1, so the maximum of the r i is r.
The atoms of L are the state formulae for r variables. We denote them
As in the binary case, state descriptions for at least r constants can be expressed as a conjunction of (instantiated) atoms,
Clearly, we have
; these sentences express all the information contained in Θ that involves b i 1 , . . . , b ir and no other constants. Polyadic atoms thus again act as the basic building blocks for all sentences of the language. Note that no 'smaller units' involving fewer variables could play this role, since the language is r-ary.
Even so, we will find it convenient to have a way of referring to blocks smaller than atoms.
Definition. The g-atoms for g ≤ r are the state formulae of L for g variables. They are denoted by
Thus the γ r h (x 1 , . . . , x r ) are just the atoms γ h (x 1 , . . . , x r ) and N r = N . Note that in the binary case there are the γ 2 h = γ h (the binary atoms) and the γ 1 k (1-atoms), which we referred to as β k in the previous section to avoid superscripts altogether.
Every state description for at least r constants can be expressed as a conjunction (39). Conversely, such a conjunction is consistent (and hence defines a state description) just when any pair of the γ h i 1 ,...,ir (b i 1 , . . . , b ir ) agree when restricted to the constants they have in common. We will find it useful to make these shared components visible so we write
This works even when m < r. Note that the γ
are such that
Let g < r. The following definition is motivated by the need to isolate the part of a state description in which at most g constants are brought together instantiating a relation. We refer to this part as to the g-ary trace of the state description. More precisely,
Definition. The g-ary trace of the state description (40), denoted by
or sometimes simply (Θ g), is defined to be
Note that this agrees with the definition of the unary trace we made in the previous section (on page 9). Any consistent conjunction of the form (41) 
where C s is some set of s-element subsets of {b 1 , . . . , b m }.
We will assume that (42), like (40), displays all the instantiated γ s h implied by ∆. In other words, we assume that r s=1 C s contains along with any {b i 1 , . . . , b is }, also all its subsets.
In addition, when writing ∆(b 1 , . . . , b m ) for a partial state description, we mean that all of b 1 , . . . , b m actually appear in it, so C 1 contains all singletons {b i } for i = 1, . . . , m. We remark also that a partial state description (42) is a state description just when C r contains all r-element subsets of {b 1 , . . . , b m }. Note that any g-ary trace of a state description is a partial state description.
We define the g-ary trace of a state formula, and a partial state formula analogously to the definitions for state descriptions.
Polyadic Signatures
As in the binary case, we need to introduce an equivalence between atoms (and more generally, between g-atoms) to capture the fact that g-atoms obtained from each other by permuting the variables represent the same thing.
Accordingly, we define
and we denote the equivalence classes of ∼ by Γ can be extended to a γ g k ∈ Γ g j ; one of these ways is to γ g h itself but there may be other possibilities. Furthermore, we define s g to be the total number of g-atoms with a given (g − 1)-ary trace. Note that this is independent of the trace chosen, and that for any given (g − 1)-ary trace, s g is the sum of the s g j over the j for which Γ g j contains an atom with this trace. We extend the definition of a signature from binary languages to r-ary languages for r > 2 in the obvious way:
Definition. The signature of a state description Θ as in (39) (or (40)) is defined to be the vector n 1 , . . . , n p , where n j is the number of i 1 , . . . , i r such that 1 ≤ i 1 < . . . < i r ≤ m and γ h i 1 ,...,ir ∈ Γ j . Thus, the signature records how many atoms from each equivalence class there are within Θ(b 1 , . . . , b m ). When m < r, the signature is not defined, but the notion of extended signature still makes sense, where the extended signature of Θ as in (40) Signature Exchangeability Principle, Sgx The probability of a state description depends only on its signature.
Sgx for L unary or binary is the same as Ex or BEx respectively. Sgx implies Ex but the converse implication does not hold in general. We gave an example of a probability function satisfying Ex but not Sgx (BEx) for r = 2 in the previous section.
Polyadic Independence
The following definition aims to capture exactly which sets of g constants are brought together instantiating a relation within a sentence:
Definition. We refer to C s φ as the set of s-sets of constants appearing in φ. For example, consider a language containing one binary relation symbol R 1 and one ternary relation symbol R 2 . For We are now in a position to formulate a general version of the Independence Principle based on atoms, as stated on Page 6 for r = 1 and on page 15 for r = 2. In this generalised version we require that the following holds for any g < r: if two quantifier free sentences have no (g + 1)-sets of constants in common then they are conditionally independent given a g-trace for the constants that they share.
Strong Independence Principle, SIP Let L be an r-ary language and let 0 ≤ g < r. Assume that φ, ψ ∈ QF SL are such that
and let b 1 , . . . , b t be the constants that φ and ψ have in common (if any). Let ∆ be a g-trace for the constants b 1 , . . . , b t when t > 0, and ∆ = (tautology) if φ and ψ have no constants in common. Then
we define w Y (Θ(a 1 , . . . , a m ) 
Note that, as in the binary case, if σ ∈ S m and Ψ(a 1 , . . . , a m ) = Θ(a σ(1) , . . . , a σ(m) ) then w Y (Θ) = w Y (Ψ).
Theorem 7. The functions w Y determine probability functions that satisfy Sgx and SIP (and hence also Ex and IP).
Furthermore, any probability function satisfying Ex and SIP is equal to w Y for some Y .
Proof. To show that w Y determines a probability function note that (i) and (ii) from page 3 clearly hold. For (iii), we will prove that for any state description Θ(a 1 , . . . , a m ) we have
where the first product is as for Θ and h i 1 ,...,i s−1 ,(m+1) is that h for which
That is, where a i 1 , . . . , a i r−1 , a m+1 ) , where γ r h and γ r k have the same (r − 1)-ary trace, is also a state description extending Θ. Since the z r k for all such k sum to 1 (from (45)), we can sum them out. Similarly, we can deal with the other r-tuples, then the (r − 1)-tuples and so on, working our way down.
Similar reasoning gives us that (47) holds even when a 1 , . . . , a m are replaced by any other distinct constants b 1 , . . . , b m , and that we have an analogous formula for the probability of partial state descriptions:
Using this, SIP is first seen to hold for partial state descriptions φ, ψ, and then employing Lemma 6, in general. We omit the details.
To prove the last part of the theorem, assume that w satisfies Ex and SIP. We define Y by
where γ Note that by Ex it does not matter which γ g h from Γ g j we take, and that (44) must hold. Writing any state description in the form (46) and using Ex and SIP, we can show by induction (adding the conjuncts for increasing numbers of constants one by one) that its probability is given by (47).
Corollary 8. Let L be an r-ary language and let µ be a normalised σ-additive measure on the Borel subsets of D L . For any θ ∈ SL define
Then the function w is a probability function on SL satisfying Sgx.
Proof. This can be proved by a straightforward checking of (P1), (P2), (P3) and Sgx, using the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem for (P3).
However, whether or not the converse to Corollary 8 holds, that is, whether any probability function satisfying Sgx can be expressed in the form (49) remains to be investigated. (recall that q is the total number of relation symbols in our language and s g was defined on page 32). We know that in the binary case discussed in the previous section, these are the unique regular probability functions satisfying Ex and the above principle. The general case remains to be further investigated.
Conclusion
We based our investigation on the notion of (polyadic) atoms as our central building blocks, since they provide the smallest complete units from which state descriptions (and hence all sentences) can be built. Using this, we were able to propose, first in the binary context and then for general polyadic languages, generalisations of the unary concept of a signature, and principles based on invariance under signatures (BEx, Sgx), independence, instantial relevance and an irrelevance principle generalising Johnson's Sufficientness Postulate, as well as probability functions satisfying these. We have also introduced the more general g-atoms for g ≤ r (where r is the arity of the language), and used these to define partial state descriptions. In addition, we were able to completely characterise the probability functions satisfying BEx, BEx+IP and Ex+BIP for binary languages. We have seen that Ex does not imply Sgx and that the signature of a state description is not a determining characteristic of it (up to a permutation of constants) as in the unary case.
This opens the door to many new questions arising from these ideas. For example, considering a fixed r-ary language, let g-atoms again be the state formulae for g variables, but this time for any positive natural number g. We 12 That is, n g j is the number of times that γ may define the g-signature of a state description for m individuals (where g ≤ m) analogously to (r-)signatures. We end this paper with some observations regarding these g-signatures, a direction to be further researched.
It is easy to see that the g-signature of a state description determines its s-signature for s < g. Hence, for such s, g, a probability function which gives state descriptions with the same s-signature the same probability, must also give the same probability to state descriptions with the same g-signature.
Conversely, however, it is not the case that the s-signature of a state description determines its g-signature for s < g, not even when r ≤ s < g. One example, for r = 2, s = 2 and g = 3, is provided by the state descriptions on page 14. Here we give another example, for r = 2, s = 3 and g = 4:
Example. Let L contain one binary relation symbol. Then the 6 state formulae (3-atoms) represented by feature only the above 3-atoms and it can be checked that they have the same 3-signature but not the same 4-signature.
